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Abstract
The empirical literature has demonstrated that housing assets exhibit larger wealth
effects than stocks (or, more broadly, financial assets), which is often interpreted as a
larger MPC (Marginal Propensity of Consumption) out of housing wealth. Still, the
question remains as to whether this stylized fact has anything to do with the collaterality
of housing assets. We build a household consumption and portfolio choice model
with two risky assets, housing and stocks, whereby housing can be used as collateral
to borrow against. The optimizing agent’s preference and investment opportunity set
generate implications of different MPCs for groups characterized by their respective
asset/debt portfolios. Under calibrated parameters from macro data, the model exhibits
the highest MPC for households who simultaneously borrow against housing asset and
invest in stocks. We examine the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) micro data
of homeowners and find no evidence of this implied collateral effect on non-durable
consumption.
JEL classification: D11,D12,D14,D91,E21,G11
key words: wealth effects; consumption; portfolio choice; housing; collateral; borrowing
constraints; household debt
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies have illustrated that housing wealth has a more significant effect on con-
sumption than financial wealth, especially equity wealth, where the wealth effect is inter-
preted as the consumption outlay changes induced by exogenous changes in wealth (Case,
Quigley, and Shiller 2005, Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter 2008). Typical empirical specifications
in the literature have taken the form
ci = β0 + βhwh,i + βsws,i + εi (1.1)
or its first-difference version
△ci = β0 + βh △wh,i + βs △ws,i +△εi
(with a host of other control variables suppressed here for ease of exposition) where ci, wh,i
and ws,i represent consumption, housing wealth, and stock wealth respectively, in level or
logarithmic units. The subscript i indexes cross-section or time-series observations. The
majority of the literature has found βh > βs1. Table 1 presents several estimates from a
selected sample of studies: depending on the source of the data and the estimation methods,
βh is around 0.04 ∼ 0.17, and βs is from negligible to 0.06 (in the logarithm of variables).
This wealth effect puzzle looms large in view of the latest housing booming cycle from
the second half of 1990s to the first half of 2000s in the United States. Figure 1 demonstrates
the popular belief that the robustly rising consumption in recent years is associated with
exuberant increases in U.S. housing prices: from 1990 q1, the ratio of consumption expen-
ditures to disposable personal income trended upwards, until it peaked at 2005 q3, roughly
mimicking the substantial appreciation of national housing prices; when real home prices
1Dvornak and Kohler (2003) is an exception, in which they find little difference between wealth effects of
these two.
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began declining after 2006 q3, the consumption-income ratio was already declining. The
connection between these two series lies in the possibility that by pledging against their
home properties, homeowners were able to refinance their mortgages or tap into available
home equity lines to fund their consumption that may include conspicuous and unnecessary
components. Greenspan and Kennedy (2005) derive the amount of the gross extraction of
equity, defined as the discretionary cashing out by homeowners against their home equity
in the home mortgage market. The net equity extraction is the gross equity extraction minus
the related costs. Figure 2 depicts the ratio of equity extractions to disposable personal
income, alongside the real national home price index: both equity extraction ratios, despite
short-term fluctuations, closely mimicked the time-series of home prices, steadily trending
up over the years. The gross equity extraction ratio began at about 3 percent of personal
disposable income, hiked as high as 12 percent at 2004 q3, and began a dramatic nosedive
in 2006. However, another notable feature, presented by Figure 1, is that the consumption
of non-durables and services (not including housing services, for instance) to DPI was flat
over these years, suggesting much of the boost in consumption expenditures was steered
towards durables. Consistent with this fact, both Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2008) and
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) find the larger housing wealth effect in total consumption
and durable consumption measures.
However, we cannot yet discard the notion that the housing wealth effect is only contained
in durable consumption. Figure 1 utilizes quarterly data and may mask otherwise discernible
patterns. Moreover, labor income is an incomplete measure of permanent income; household
net worth, defined as the balance of assets minus liabilities, hence taking into account of
both assets and liabilities of household balance sheet, is more comprehensive than current
income alone in measuring the extent of aﬄuence that people feel, for human and non-
human wealth together provide the stream of permanent income based upon which people
plan their consumption. Figure 3 illustrates two household consumption measures, total
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consumption and the consumption of non-durable goods plus services, to the net worth
ratio, in which we see an uptrend evident in both of the series in later years, even though its
level has not terribly exceeded the historical level achieved during late 1980s or early 1990s.
We observe a sharp increase in this ratio since roughly 2005, when households presumably
started to reap benefits from rapid housing appreciation. This take-off in upward trends was
much steeper than similar increases during the internet booming years of the late 1990s, also
exemplifying the claim that the housing wealth effect is larger than the stock effect.
The prevailing literature also regards why βh > βs as a purely empirical issue (Case,
Quigley, and Shiller 2005, Carrol, Otsuka, and Slacalek 2006). To some extent, it is. However,
there must be something fundamentally different between housing and financial wealth
that leads consumers to view their values differently, and, we cannot gain our knowledge
without a conceptual framework. Various hypotheses exist, but the collaterality of housing,
as exemplified by Figure 2, is seen as one that could be used to explain the difference between
the wealth effects of housing and stock assets, within the framework of rational choice. The
conventional wisdom holds that, due to its collaterality, a one percentage increase in housing
prices induces the expansion of the budget set more than that induced by a one percentage
increase in other forms of wealth, such as stocks. Hence, this implies that an economic agent
will respond more to the increase. Other distinctive features exist between housing and
stocks, such as the liquidity difference, but they may indeed imply the opposite, a weaker
consumption response to housing than to stock assets.
Klyuev and Mills (2007) examines macro-level time series data for the United States
and other developed countries to see if the amount of home equity withdrawal (slightly
different from equity extraction used in Greenspan and Kennedy (2005)) can predict the
time-variations of saving rates. They fail to find any significant impacts. However, the
non-existence of the macro-level evidence does not necessarily exclude such functionality
on the micro-level, for probably a sizable portion of the population has not borrowed heavily
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against their housing assets. To investigate such a possibility requires a decomposition of
the population into those who borrow and those who do not. By the same token, Carrol,
Otsuka, and Slacalek (2006) argue for the possiblity of the MPC difference for stockholders
and non-stockholders, and the fact that stocks are usually held by a small, richer proportion
of the population may underlie a smaller MPC for stocks.
To verify the composition hypothesis in combination with the collaterality of housing
assets, we need to clarify how borrowing on housing assets would affect one’s consumption
decision. To accomplish this, we build a continuous-time intertemporal two risky asset
allocation model in which one of the risky assets (housing) can be pledged as collateral to
borrow against. We derive the quantitative implications from the model through parame-
terization, and examine them against the evidence from the PSID samples, which contain
detailed information of the households. One of the most important implications regarding
collateral effects is that agents may exhibit various MPCs, depending on whether they utilize
the housing collateral to borrow funds and whether they hold stocks. In particular, the group
that holds both sizable stocks and sizable debts should exhibit the highest MPC, compared
to others. This quantitative implication was derived with the assistance of calibrated pa-
rameters, but it makes sense economically: those who simultaneously borrow and invest are
”arbitragers” who seek to reap the profits from the risk adjusted returns, more inclined to
do so than others who passively await the windfall, or who are constrained from borrowing
more. Therefore, these ”arbitragers” are more likely to channel part of their profits into
consumption in revelation of their risk preference. Bringing household mortgage debts into
the empirical quest is an improvement of this paper on the earlier literature that empirically
examine the housing wealth effect. For an overview of the results, we find modest evidence
supportive of the model predictions in the cross section analyses, but inconsistency is found
to exist in the time-series pattern. Moreover, looking into the details of the conditional
distribution of the consumption on net worth, we observe the heterogeneity of the collateral
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effects between the low quantile and high quantile observations.
Other related literature includes Hurst and Stafford (2004), who find that households
under liquidity constraints are more likely to refinance their home loans to tap into their
home equity to smooth out the consumption stream, even when the interest rate is rising
during the period. We do not zoom in on households’ refinancing decisions, but instead
implicitly assume that households would continuously be keen on refinancing options,
given that the costs are negligible, compared to refinancing benefits. Another branch of the
literature examines quantitatively the life-cycle effects of housing wealth (see Cocco (2005)
and cited literature therein). As illuminating as these studies are, they choose to focus on
wealth portofolio variation, not on what the most fundamental characteristics associated
with housing assets are that may generate the difference in wealth effects. Moreover, the
larger wealth effects of housing assets exist on the micro-level as well as on the macro-level,
with or without life-cycle complications (Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2005). In contrast to
these papers, we feel that a framework of an infinite horizon for the economic agent will
serve to reconcile all sorts of empirical evidence with the benefit of analytical convenience.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the intertemporal
portfolio-choice model that incorporates the collaterality of housing assets; Section 3 pa-
rameterizes the model to derive the quantitative implications for the sub-groups defined
by their asset/debt portfolios, and then compares them to the estimates obtained from PSID
cross section samples; Section 4 concludes by acknowledging some of the limitations of this
analysis and points to possible future work.
2 Housing as Collateral
The stylized empirical finding that βh is greater than βs poses a challenge for the rational
portfolio-choice framework initiated by Merton (1990). This framework assumes a variety
of stationary investing opportunity sets plus the CRRA utility function, and the derived
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consumption rule has always taken the form
ct = ψcwt = ψc(wh,t +ws,t) = ψcwh,t +ψcws,t (2.1)
Apparently, as long as the individual does not distinguish different format of assets, we
would always obtain that MPC, coinciding with ψc, is the same for housing and other
assets2.
Before dismissing this framework as an appropriate one to interpret the large body of
empirical estimates, we need to bring the single most important feature often mentioned
regarding the distinction between housing and other forms of financial wealth: that the
house can be used as collateral to borrow funds. Even though other financial assets may also
be able to be used as collateral, a housing asset is more likely. We set forth to isolate how
this feature will affect the consumption rule (2.1). In doing so, we essentially treat housing
as another asset with the same liquidity and the transaction costs as stocks. Houses are
freely bought and sold, and one can always obtain her/his desired house in a market, with
the desired footage, structure, and location. When the only wealth form held by an agent
is housing, s/he can downsize it to any desirable level, or take an equity loan to squeeze
cash out to finance her/his consumption, at no additional transaction cost. This is, of course,
highly hypothetical. However, we reiterate that including any such frictions in the housing
market would diminish the appeal of owning housing assets, thus, it is only reaffirming,
rather than enlightening, the housing wealth effect puzzle. We assume a competitive rent
market in this paper. Any psychological factors or utility that an economic agent may derive
from merely owning a house is excluded here, to concentrate on the collaterality feature of
housing. We will discuss some of the limitations arising from these idealized assumptions
2Strictly speaking, the MPC interpretation of β only applies when variables such as c and w’s are measured in
levels. β should be interpretated as the elasticity of consumption to wealth, when those variables are measured
instead in logarithm units. In the latter case, however, β is supposed to conincide with the wealth ratio of each
asset. In the empirical results, using the log of the variables, β is far less than the wealth ratio for each asset,
which only lends an explanation to error-ridden issues and will thus be less interesting.
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in the concluding section.
The collaterality of housing does not immediately lend itself to a higher MPC, even if
it is intuitively appealing. When an agent takes out a loan against appreciated housing,
her/his increased budget set endows her/him for more current consumption; on the other
hand, s/he has to aside a portion of the budget, to pay back the loan in the future. This
would offset the incentive of more current consumption. The tradeoff of these two forces
can be not be explicitly characterized without an intertemporal choice model. Fleming and
Zariphopoulou (1991) solve the optimal portofolio-choice problem in the environment of
one risky asset, plus one riskless asset, where the risky asset can be pledged as the collateral
for borrowing. We extend their analysis to an environment of two-risky assets, plus one
riskless asset, where one of those risky assets, housing, can be served as collateral. None of
these three assets can be sold short, and the consumer/investor has to maintain her/his net
worth to be positive at any point in time.
Let Dt be the outstanding debt level that the agent can establish by borrowing in
continuous-time at the borrowing interest rate R, which is greater than the risk-free rate
of return, r f . We highlight the borrowing constraint imposed by the collateral feature of
housing assets by the requirement that the outstanding debt level, at any instantanenous
point in time, cannot exceed the current housing value
Dt ≤ wh,t (2.2)
This immediately implies wt, the net worth of the agent, is also non-negative
wt = wb,t +wh,t +ws,t −Dt ≥ 0 (2.3)
where wb,t is the amount of wealth the agent will allocate to the riskless saving deposits. The
collateral constraint (2.2) also implies, even though the borrowing rate R is constant, that
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the agent can freely choose how much more to borrow, or how much to pay back, as long
as the outstanding debt will always be lower than current housing wealth. This assumption
is consistent with the prepayment and refinancing activities widely existing in mortgage
borrowing. The constraint rules out the possibility of defaulting, and empirically, we only
focus on those households who are not defaulting or are not experiencing foreclosure during
the period. We assume that the price of housing and of stocks evolve according to the
stochastic differential equations
d P j,t = µ jP j,td t + σ jP j,td z j,t ( j = h, s) (2.4)
where z j,t are standard, independent Brownian motion processes. The long-run correlation of
housing real returns and stock real returns is extremely low, about 0.01 (Piazzesi, Schneider,
and Tuzel 2007), even though introducing the inter-correlations of the housing and stock
risks is conceptually straightforward3. The wealth accumulation equation becomes
d wt =r f wtd t + [(µh − r f )wh,t + (µs − r f )ws,t − (R − r f )Dt]d t − ctd t
+ σhwh,td zh,t + σsws,td zs,t (2.5)
Assume the agent possesses the value function
J(w) = ∫ +∞
0
e−βtu(ct)d t (2.6)
given initial endowment w and u(ct) = ct1−γ1−γ where γ is the reciprocal of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, non-distinguishable from the coefficient of constant relative risk
3If income is introduced into the model, Cocco (2005) finds that aggregate income shocks are strongly
positively correlated with housing returns, but uncorrelated with stock returns. However, the mere introduction
of income in the model will not change the formula, such as (2.1), in which coefficients before housing and stock
assets will be the same. A model incorporating labor income risk and housing consumption is available upon
request, in which we illustrate that MPC is affected by the composition of human wealth, defined as present
value of future income stream, and non-human wealth.
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aversion4. This CRRA utility function enables us to derive the consumption rules that are
dependent on preference parameters, but are independent of the wealth level. The optimiza-
tion problem, thus, is to maximize (2.6) subject to (2.5), (2.2), (2.3) and wb,t,wh,t,ws,t,Dt ≥ 0.
It follows that the value function J(w) should solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation
βJ(w) = sup
c,wh,ws,D
[u(c) +DcJ(w)] (2.7)
where
DcJ(w) = [r f w + (µh − r f )wh + (µs − r f )ws − (R − r f )D − c] Jw(w)
+ 1
2
(w2hσ2h +w2sσ2s)Jww(w) (2.8)
We conjecture J(w) = K w1−γ1−γ . Therefore Jw(w) = Kw−γ, Jww(w) = K(−γ)w−γ−1. Given γ > 0,
Jw(w) > 0 and Jww(w) < 0.
The solution to this dynamic optimization problem can be tackled through a transforma-
tion into a static optimization problem, at the core of which is to characterize the combined
budget constraint by (2.2) and (2.3). Following Fleming and Zariphopoulou’s (1991) analysis,
we introduce the following claim before characterizing the solution.
Claim 1. Given r f < R < µh < µs, define
g(p, q,wh,ws,D) = 12σ2hw2hq + 12σ2s w2s q + (µh − r f )whp + (µs − r f )wsp − (R − r f )Dp (2.9)
where p > 0, q < 0 and (wh,ws,D) ∈△(w) defined as
△ (w) = {(wh,ws,D) ∶ wh ≥ 0,ws ≥ 0,D ≥ 0,wh ≥ D,w −wh −ws +D ≥ 0} (2.10)
4For our purposes, we have chosen not to incorporate the recursive utility specification as in Epstein and Zin
(1991) that separates the parameters governing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the risk aversion.
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Let
wkD = (µk −R)p−σ2kq , wk f = (µk − r f )p−σ2kq , (k = h, s)
and assume that
wsD ≤ whD, wsD +whD ≤ wh f (2.11)
the maximization solution to (2.9) subject to (2.10) and (2.11) can be characterized as (w∗h ,w∗s ,D∗)
such that
1. when w < wsD: D∗ = whD −w(> 0), w∗s = 0, w∗h = whD;
2. when wsD ≤ w < whD +wsD: D∗ = whD +wsD −w(> 0), w∗s = wsD, w∗h = whD;
3. when whD +wsD ≤ w < wh f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = 0, w∗h = w;
4. when wh f ≤ w < wh f +ws f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = 0, w∗h = wh f ;
5. when w ≥ wh f +ws f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = ws f , w∗h = wh f .
Proof. See Appendix. ∎
r f < R < µh < µs is needed in our infinite-horizon context, but may not be necessary for
finite life-cycle models. For a graphical understanding of what the constraint set looks like,
refer to Figure 5. Figure 5 visualizes the surface of {D ∶ D = wh} and {D ∶ D = wh + ws − w}
for w = 2. The constraint set △(w) requires (wh,ws,D) in the space below {D ∶ D = wh}
and above {D ∶ D = wh + ws − w}. However, the minus sign before the term with D in (2.9)
indicates that, for the optimal solution, D is to be small as possible, which in turn suggests
optimal candidate points for D should be on the surface {D ∶ D = wh + ws − w}, and that
D ≤ wh should not be binding except those intersecting with {D ∶ D = wh + ws − w} (Figure
6). To browse some numerical examples: Point A(3,2,3) is a candidate for the optimal
solution; however, points such as (3,3,4) would be violating the collateral constraint, even
though the net worth identity is satisfied; Point B(3,0,1) is also a candidate for the optimal
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solution, but points such as (3,0,2) would be violating the net worth identity, even though
the collateral constraint is satisfied. The restrictions in (2.11) are imposed in light of our
data only including homeowners. Given these relationships between the risk profiles of the
housing and stock assets, agents would always begin with accumulating housing assets, i.e.,
a renter who would rather buy stocks than a house is ruled out in this model. Our parameter
values to be chosen in next section are also consistent with these restrictions. The solution
without these restrictions in place would be far more practically complicated, for it would
involve more corner solution comparisons.
To utilize the results in Claim 1, let p = Jw(w) and q = Jww(w). Employing the standard
guess-and-verify procedure used in the continuous-time finance literature, we proceed to
obtain the solutions corresponding to each case of Claim 1, summarized as Theorem 1 below:
Theorem 1. Let p ≡ Jw(w), q ≡ Jww(w), pq ≡ w−γ , c∗ = K− 1γw, and
ψkD = wkDw = µk −Rσ2kγ , ψk f = wk fw = µk − r fσ2kγ , k = h, s
and
ψsD ≤ ψhD , ψsD +ψhD ≤ ψh f (2.12)
1. when ψsD > 1: D∗ = (ψhD − 1)w, w∗s = 0, w∗h = ψhDw,
c∗ = [β
γ
− 1 − γ
γ
[R + (µh −R)ψhD] + 1 − γ2 ψ2hDσ2h]w ≡ α1w
2. when ψsD ≤ 1 < ψhD +ψsD: D∗ = (ψhD +ψsD − 1)w, w∗s = ψsDw, w∗h = ψhDw,
c∗ = [β
γ
− 1 − γ
γ
[R + (µh −R)ψhD + (µs −R)ψsD] + 1 − γ2 (ψ2hDσ2h +ψ2sDσ2s)]w ≡ α2w
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3. when ψhD +ψsD ≤ 1 < ψh f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = 0, w∗h = w,
c∗ = [β
γ
− 1 − γ
γ
µh + 1 − γ2 σ2h]w ≡ α3w
4. when ψh f ≤ 1 < ψh f +ψs f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = 0, w∗h = ψh f w,
c∗ = [β
γ
− 1 − γ
γ
[r f + (µh − r f )ψh f ] + 1 − γ2 ψ2h fσ2h]w ≡ α4w
5. when 1 ≥ ψh f +ψs f : D∗ = 0, w∗s = ψs f w, w∗h = ψh f w,
c∗ = [β
γ
− 1 − γ
γ
[r f + (µh − r f )ψh f + (µs − r f )ψs f ] + 1 − γ2 (ψ2h fσ2h +ψ2s fσ2s)]w ≡ α5w
c∗ = K− 1γw is obtained from the maximization of c on the right-hand side of (2.7). The
imposed constraint (2.12) is the counterpart of (2.11) in Claim 1. The demarcation of these five
groups depends upon the risk-return parameter values of the housing and stock portfolio
of the individuals, relative to their degree of risk aversion, γ, which may be heterogeneous
across the population. Moreover, Case and Shiller (1989) argue that the housing markets
may be largely inefficient, resulting in heterogeneity in the risk-return profiles of houses. We
will explore the impacts of these concerns on the calibration results.
Theorem 1 informs us that the agents can be classified into several cases, according to
their portfolio composition of debts, housing and stock assets. The consumption rule out of
the net worth for each case may be different, depending on the specific parameter values.
More specifically, letting α denote the MPC of consumption rule derived in Theorem 1 for
each case, we can identify four groups according to their wealth holdings (see Table 2).
Notice that the Benchmark group includes two cases, for these two cases are identical in
terms of net worth compositions. The MPC for each group would be a weighted average of
MPC for the cases in Theorem 1 that are included in the particular group. We turn to the
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empirical part related to this model in the next section.
3 Some Empiricals
Apparently, it will be difficult to analytically compare the relative magnitudes of MPC for
each case in Theorem 1. Putting the complexity of the formulas aside, each case corresponds
to a different segment of values for ψ’s, e.g., ψsD is greater than 1 in Case 1, but less than 1
in Case 2. If the only heterogeneity source is from γ, this would imply γ in Case 1 is greater
than γ in Case 2, which would complicate the comparison of MPCs for Case 1 with Case
2. We instead resort to the computation of the range of MPCs, by looking at the reasonable
values for these primitive parameters to gauge the effects5.
3.1 Calibration
To offer an idea of the returns and volatilities for the various assets, Figure 4 depicts the
upward trends of the various asset levels in last three decades, when 1991q1 is normalized
at 100. Stocks exhibited the most significant upturn trend during this period, albeit with
the most volatility. Housing appreciation accelarated since the beginning of 2000s, and its
volatility appeared to be much less than stocks. The difference in volatility in housing and
stocks may have contributed to their wealth effect difference.
We use the standard procedure (see, e.g., Hull (2008, Chapter 13)) to estimate the expected
return and volatility corresponding to the Brownian motion processes (2.4) for the housing
and stock markets. To be consistent with the time span of micro data on households, and
the general perception that the run-up in housing prices fuels the equity leverage ratio, we
choose quarterly data on housing and stock prices from 1996 to 2007 to obtain annualized
estimates. The annual expected housing price appreciation for single homes from 1996
5We also tried for other sets of parameter values, estimated from various periods and indices; to the extent
that these parameter values satisfied the presumptions in Theorem 1, the calibrated results were qualitatively
similar to what we present next.
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to 2007, according to S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, is 6.3%, with a
volatility per annum of 3.3%. This is in sharp contrast to its much lower, long-run mean
of about 2% (Campbell and Cocco 2003, Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel 2007). For stocks,
we calculate from CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock index data (including distributions)
that the expected annual return of stocks is 10.3%, and the corresponding volatility is 17.2%
per annum for the same period. The average one-year treasury bond yield for the same
period is about 4.4%. The expected annual mortgage rate, measured by the 30-year fixed
mortgage rate, seems higher than the expected housing return for the period. However,
mortgage payments are tax-deductible in the United States, therefore, we discount the
mortgage rate by 25%, roughly the average personal income tax rate, before calculating the
effective mortgage rate. After this adjustment is adjusted, the expected annual mortgage rate
is approximately 5%. These parameter values, taken together, are consistent with the setup
of our model that an infinitely-living agent is willing to borrow, but unwilling to default. We
summarize the parameters for the calibration in Table 3.
Recall that in Table 2, we classify agents into four different groups based on their portfolios
of stock holdings and debt levels, for stock holdings and debts are what we can observe
from an actual data set. Figure 7 plots the MPC associated with the agents endowed with
heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion, but with the same risk-return profiles of financial
assets. The heterogeneity in risk aversions alone generates observations for all of these
four groups. One substantial feature of the plot is that the MPC for the Group DS (people
who both borrow and hold stocks) is distinguishingly higher than two of the other three
groups that do not carry debt. Intuitively, the fact that some households are able to borrow
implies that they are not liquidity constrained; the fact that they choose to invest in stocks
implies their elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, hence consumption will not tend
to change drastically in response to any exogenous change of rates of return. These two
factors together generate a higher propensity for them to consume out of their net worth.
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Agents must be at the high end of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution if they borrow,
but do not invest, and their MPCs are not unambiguously higher or lower than those who
both borrow and invest.
Case and Shiller (1989) argue that, due to the inefficiency of the housing market, there
may exist heterogeneity in σh cross-sectionally. We now experiment with heterogeneity in σh,
the volatility of housing returns. Instead of a single value, we set σh to vary over the range
from 0.01 to 0.08. Figure 8 illustrate the change of group composition over the range of σh for
different values of γ. Uniformly, when σh increases, which means more variation in future
housing price appreciation, the MPC decreases, because agents become more precautionary
in consumption. For the same range of σh, a larger γ phases out groups with outstanding
debts and phases in groups with more savings. Again, the MPC for Group DS, as long as it
exists in the population, is greater than the two other groups without debts.
How would this exercise add to our understanding of the discrepancy of MPCs between
housing and stock wealth? If the population consists of all the five groups encompassed by
Theorem 1, the cross-section regression of consumption on housing and stock wealth will be
their weighted average
E(c ∣ wh,ws) = 5∑
j=1 p jE(c j ∣ wh, j,ws, j)
= p1α1(wh,1 −D1) + p2α2(wh,2 +ws,2 −D2) + p3α3wh,3 + p4α4wh,4 + p5α5(wh,5 +ws,5)
(3.1)
where p j ( j = 1,⋯,5) is the proportion of observations of each group in the population.
This defies the interpretation of a typical specification (1.1) which implicitly assumes the
homogenous composition of a population. Without the decomposition into separate groups
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for the population, this regression becomes
E(c ∣ wh,ws) = 5∑
j=1(p jα j)wh + (p2α2 + p5α5)ws − (p1α1 + p2α2)D (3.2)
from which it is no wonder why the coefficient before wh is greater than that before ws. This
also applies to the time-series data, if observations belonging to different cases in Theorem
1 shifted in and out in the time-series, which would affect the aggregate macro data, if
the parameter values are time-varying. A decomposition based upon the observations’
asset/debt portfolio, which allows us to examine the behavior of the groups before being
aggregated, as in (3.1), is necessary to examine this possibility. We turn to this point in the
next subsection.
3.2 Evidence from PSID sample
We choose Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data set, a representative panel of the
United States current population starting from 1968, for our analysis of households on the
micro level. PSID collects respondents’ financial information every five years up to 1999,
and every two years thereafter. The limitation of PSID data is that it does not provide
consumption expenditure data as detailed as in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
On the other hand, CEX has much less information concerning households’ balance sheets.
However, PSID has collected expenditure information on a few essential items, from which
we can extrapolate useful aggregate measure of non-durable consumption by Skinner’s
(1987) method.
We extract five cross-section samples from PSID 1994 survey and successive biennial
surveys from 1999 to 2005, corresponding to the period for which we adopt the parameter
values in last section. For each cross-section sample, we restrict our attention to households
who own a primary residence unit, have not moved in the year, and have positive household
head labor income. These waves of PSID surveys provide self-assessed values on the house
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and stock holdings. Cocco (2005) provides evidence that the PSID self reported housing
values follow relatively well with the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI)
constructed by Freddie Mac and Freddie Mae, and the Housing Price Index contructed by
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Overnight (OFHEO). We leave out all households
who had no idea how much their house was worth at the time, as well as those whose net
worth (home equity included) were negative. After all these restrictions, we are left with
cross-section sample sizes varying from 2531 to 3819 for the period.
For the consumption measure, we adopt two kinds of measurements: the simple sum
of food, utility and transportation from the PSID, and the predicted total consumption of
non-durable goods and services from these components. To obtain the predicted consump-
tion measure, we use the coefficients of the regressions of all non-durable goods and service
expenditures on these components from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) of com-
parable years. This prediction approach was first advocated by Skinner (1987). We use the
assembled CEX data from Anguiar and Hurst (2009) to obtain the prediction coefficients
pertaining to 1994-2005. The R2’s for these prediction equations are more than 80 percent.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the four groups during this period, depending on
their asset/debt profile. The coefficients from regressions are similar in magnitude to those
in Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2008). The predicted consumption measure appears to be
more reasonable than the other simple sum measure, which is, at times, extremely skewed
by outlier observations. The households who had stock holdings, but no mortgage debts,
though a small proportion of the sample, are older and richer than those who had outstand-
ing mortgage debt only, which consists of the largest proportion of the sample (except for
1994). This is consistent with the crowding-out effect of housing assets on other financial
assets in the literature (Cocco 2005). It can also be observed off Table 4 that the average
mortgage debts have been increasing during this period.
Our model claims that the wealth effect of housing and stocks ought to be the same, after
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properly taking into account their risk/return characteristics, and the difference in the MPC
stems only from the collaterality of the housing asset, which suggests the decomposition into
four groups by their asset/debt profiles. We restrict the coefficients before housing and stocks
to be equal, and examine the difference in MPC of their net worth for these four groups.
These four groups are constructed according to their definitions in our model: a household
is classified into Group DS if it had a mortgage balance outstanding, and held a positive
amount of stocks in non-retirement accounts for the reference year; Group D includes those
who owed an outstanding mortgage balance, yet, had not owned a positive ammount of
stocks for the reference year; Group S and Benchmark Group are defined accordingly. For
our purposes, it will be the most illuminating to compare the MPC of Group DS with that of
Group D, for the calibrated prediction of the model is the sharpest between these two. This
is illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 that demonstrate that the MPC of Group DS is adjacent to
those of Group D and the Benchmark Group. Any misclassification of observations among
these three groups will blur the real difference in their MPCs. In all regressions, we control
for labor income, family size, and household age, although their coefficients are not the focus
of this paper. Table 5 contains detailed information of all the estimates of the MPCs.
Figure 9 presents all of the regression estimates for Group DS and Group S, based upon
the predicted non-durable goods and services consumption measure. For the weighted OLS
regressions, in three of the five survey years, the MPC of Group DS is dominating that of
Group S, and is consistent with our model prediction, and these two series co-move with each
other. Moreover, the coefficients before the net worth for Group S are mostly insignificant.
However, in year 2005, presumably the period when the activity of home equity extraction
peaked, these two MPCs switched their relative signs, and the MPC of Group S dominated
Group DS. This is also contradicting the pattern we observe from Figure 3, in which both
total consumption and non-durable consumption rise since 2005.
There also exists a difference in MPC when breaking down the conditional distribution
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of consumption. Here, the same pattern between the MPC of Group DS and MPC of Group
S can be replicated in the first quartile regressions. Yet, in the median regressions and third
quartile regressions, the opposite occurs: the MPC of Group S is greater than the MPC of
Group DS. Quantile regressions are less sensitive to outlier observations, and the fact that OLS
results are consistent with the lower quantile results suggests that the greater magnitude of
MPC for Group DS in OLS estimates is largely driven by the observations of lower quantiles
in consumption. Note that our regressions are not breaking the observations of each cross-
section sample down into quantiles based on net worth; instead, all quantile regressions are
conditional on the net worth for all observations. This may hint that the collateral effect
matters more for those households whose consumption is less than the average, for possible
unobserved idiosyncratic reasons that may include, for instance, the uncertainty of future
economic conditions. Moreover, F-tests for βDS > βS are insignificant in all cases, whereas
those significant ones pertain to cases where βS > βDS (Table 5). This is contradictory to the
collateral impact implied from macro data, or at the very least, it suggest the effect is largely
absent from the consumption of non-durable components.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper sets up the collaterality of housing assets as the null hypothesis, and attempts
to gauge its effect on MPC. The evidence from the PSID data supporting this hypothesis is
contradictory to calibrated predictions from macro data based upon the same model. With
sylized assumptions in place, any effect would be deemed as the upper bound of the wealth
effect that can possibly be attributed to collaterality. In particular, the fact that we fail to
find any substantial support for the cross-section sample of year 2005 is curious, belying
the belief that the consumption boost in recent years was largely fueled by the easy credit
pledged against homeowners’ equity. However, due to the limitations in PSID data, our
consumption measure is the aggregate of non-durable goods and services; whether and how
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consumers tap into their home equity to finance durable goods and services expenditures,
such as health care or education, or other investments other than housing, stocks, and bank
deposits, is unexamined in this paper. In fact, all these analyses echo the hint from Figure
1 that the boost in consumption due to the housing collateral booming may take place in
durable goods and services consumption.
We intentionally choose not to state precisely what possible alternative hypotheses are.
These alternative hypotheses may zoom in on consumers’ psychological factors – e.g., people
do not treat different forms of wealth all the same (Thaler 1990), or on intrinsic preferences
– people simply prefer living in their own houses rather than renting, or on the comple-
mentarity of housing anc consumption – people simply consume more if they are living
in a bigger house, as more lights will be needed or more gas will be burnt for heating.
However, these possibilities exist regardless of the collaterality of the house. Our attempt
is to isolate the collateral effect to investigate. These alternative hypotheses are unlikely to
generate the same predictions on the differences in the MPCs as ours, when the population is
devided into sub-groups by their asset/debt portfolios. Nonethless, incorporating elements
of these alternative hypotheses to bring up fresh insights will be worthwhile extensions of
our model.
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A Tables and Figures
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Data dimension Data source Log of housing wealth Log of financial wealth
Bostic et al. (2008) Cross-section  CEX matched with SCF 0.042~0.06 (for housing value) 0.018~0.024 (for financial wealth)
0.076~0.247 (for home equity) 0.009~0.065 (for financial net worth)
Case et al. (2005) Panel International country-level data 0.10~0.17 N/A~0.02 (for stock wealth)
(long time series) U.S. state-level data 0.03~0.10 N/A~0.06 (for stock wealth)(a)
Level of housing wealth Level of financial wealth
Dvornak & Kohler (2003) Panel 0.024~0.036(b) 0.06~0.12
(long time series)
Klyuev & Mills (2007)(b) Time series 0.02 -0.009(c )
Levin (1998)
aggregate level of five states in 
Australia
Note: (a) Testing of housing wealth effect equal to stock wealth effect is unambiguously rejected in each specification; (b) all variables are measured as a 
ratio to disposable income; (c) coefficient not significant at 10 percent.
U.S., Australia, Canada, U.K., 
country-level
Table 1: Selected estimates of wealth effects in literature
Wealth Portfolio  Corresponding to Theorem 1 Group MPC
Group D D*>0, W*s=0 Case 1 α1
Group S D*=0, W*s>0 Case 5 α5
Group DS D*>0, W*s>0 Case 2 α2
Benchmark Group D*=0, W*s=0 Case 3, 4 α3 , α4
Notes: W*h>0 for all groups. The Group MPC column indicates that the MPC for each group 
will be a weighted average of MPCs of cases in Theorem 1 included in the group. 
Table 2: Classification of four groups by asset/debt portfolio
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Figure 1: U.S. real home price index and consumption/income Ratio: 1990 Q1 – 2008 Q4
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Figure 2: U.S. real home price index and equity extraction/income Ratio: 1990 Q1 – 2005 Q1
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Figure 3: Ratio of household consumption to net worth
28
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Figure 4: Financial and housing market indice (1991q1=100)
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Description Parameter Value
Degree of risk aversion γ 3
Discount rate β 0.05
Risk-free interest rate rf 0.044
Borrowing premium R-rf 0.007
Housing return premium μh-rf 0.02
Housing return volatility σh 0.033
Stock return premium μs-rf 0.059
Stock return volatility σs 0.172
Baseline Parameter Values
Notes: all parameter values are in annual terms.
Table 3: Baseline parameter values used for calibration
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Figure 7: MPC for different groups based on baseline parameter values: heterogeneity in γ
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Figure 8: MPC for different groups based on baseline parameter values: heterogeneity in σh
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